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THE IMPORTANCE OF INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION IN FORGING TAX POLICY
Hugh J. Ault*
My thesis is simple and ties together various parts of the
Symposium discussions. Without intensified international
cooperation, there won't be an income tax on capital income for
very long. Which is to say there won't be an income tax for
very long, but a consumption tax in some form, or worse, some
package of transaction taxes. Obviously, there are some people
here-X number of people at least-who would welcome the
consumption tax result. But if you start from the premise that
we should try at least to preserve the income tax, and that we
need multilateral efforts to do so, the question then becomes
how to achieve this result. That brings me to Professor
Thuronyi's paper.
The paper makes a welcome contribution to the growing
literature on what forms international cooperation in the direct
tax area might take. I think that I agree with all the various
parts of the paper, but I have some reservations about the way
they are put together and some of the conclusions that are
reached. Most basically, I think an international organization
which focuses mostly on a multilateral treaty puts the wrong
priority as to where efforts on international cooperation should
be focused. To revert to the somewhat dangerous metaphor we
were using yesterday, we principally should be concerned with
termite extermination, not with making sure some of the
rooms in the house are tidied up.
But even on a narrower point, I am not convinced about
the advantages of a multilateral treaty to replace the existing
network of bilateral treaties. First of all, to a large extent, we
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already have a multilateral treaty in the Organization of Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") Model; which is
the basis for almost all current treaties, involving both devel-
oped and developing countries. I am pleased to note that Pro-
fessor Thuronyi cites with approval the American Law Insti-
tute Study which states, "[t]he OECD Model has almost ac-
quired the status of an international agreement."' A number of
people who worked on that project are here, and I am sure
they share my satisfaction that the Study is still having an
influence.
The basic question is: What would be gained by making
the treaty more explicitly multilateral? When I look at the
multilateral tax treaty I am most familiar with-the Nordic
Treaty-the text is either substantially identical to the OECD
Model or else has a series of references to the special problems
of fitting together the legal systems of the five countries repre-
sented: What is a utdelning under Danish law? What is the
status of a Swedish enkel bolag? It is of course useful to have
all this in one place, but I wonder what a treaty would be like
if it wasn't dealing with five countries but fifteen or fifty or one
hundred fifty. More fundamentally, I see the treaties as pri-
marily a bilateral means to work out the way in which the
specifics of the tax systems of the two countries fit together,
within the general framework of the allocation of taxing rights
and obligations set out in the OECD Model.
Now, of course, there are problems with consistent inter-
pretation and making sure that the same terms are interpret-
ed in the same way by courts in the various countries. An
important source for uniform inter-operation here is the OECD
Commentaries. One notices these days much greater accep-
tance of the Commentaries in the courts as a legitimate and, in
some cases, binding source of interpretative material. More-
over, there are other means to insure uniform interpretation.
For example, the Memorandum of Understanding to the U.S.-
Austrian treaty provides, "[it is understood that provisions of
the treaty drafted according to the corresponding provisions of
the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) shall generally have the same meanings as expressed
1. Victor Thuronyi, International Tax Cooperation and a Multilateral Treaty,
26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1641 (2001).
[Vol. XXVI:41694
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
in the OECD Commentary thereon .... .2 The Commen-
tary-as it may be revised from time to time-constitutes a
means of interpretation in the sense of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties of May 23, 1969.
In addition, the Model itself, as adopted by the Council in
the form of a Recommendation, and thus constituting a high
level political commitment, takes the position that subsequent
Commentary is to be applied to existing treaties, and this
practice has been followed in the recent Partnership report. So,
uniform interpretation is a problem, but not necessarily an
insurmountable one. Professor Thuronyi goes on to mention
other problems-like the fascinating issue of triangular situa-
tions and the like-the kind of needlepoint work that tax law-
yers the world around love, but I wonder if these issues,
viewed from a larger perspective, warrant the cannon of an
international organization focused on treaties.
Professor Thuronyi mentions one point, however, which I
think provides the appropriate transition to what I think the
focus should be. He discusses the problem of a country which
wishes to tax inbound portfolio investment but is reluctant to
do so because taxing non-residents may drive the capital to
other jurisdictions. This, of course, is a classic problem of tax
competition, but not one about which a multilateral treaty,
along the lines of any of the existing treaties, really can do
anything. If the treaty allows a positive rate of tax on interest,
that does not mean that all countries will in fact impose the
tax, as witnessed, for example, by the U.S. portfolio interest
exemption. The treaty can limit taxing rights, but it can't force
the country to impose a tax and that is the issue which tax
competition raises.
However, one can take Professor Thuronyi's proposal as
broader than I have been reading it and view the focus not on
"treaty," but on "multilateral," in the sense of the need for
some international institutional structure in which multilater-
al co-operation can take place. This structure could be used to
reach some general understanding as to how tax systems
should interact, what are appropriate and inappropriate mea-
sures for countries to introduce, how they should take into
2. Taxation Convention with Austria, July 20, 1996, U.S.-Austria, Memoran-
dum of Understanding, at http//ftp.fedworld.gov/pub/irs-treaty/austria.pdf.
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account the effects which their domestic law changes would
have on other countries, and similar matters.
But I wouldn't put that structure in the form of a treaty
with legally binding international commitments. Rather, the
focus should be on a body in which countries can have some
degree of assurance that, where they are accepting certain
restrictions on their tax sovereignty, other countries will be
taking the same steps. This is the classic prisoner's dilemma,
or assurance game situation. But to think that we can get to,
or need, the binding commitments which a treaty would entail,
at least at this stage of the development of international coop-
eration, seems to me potentially to harm the whole exercise.
Reliance on soft law, monitoring, and the recognition of mutual
advantage are what should be stressed; not the existence of
formal treaty obligations.
Let us look at what international cooperation, without
binding commitments, has been able to accomplish to date:
" The Model Convention itself;
" The Transfer Pricing Guidelines;
" The 1998 Report on Harmful Tax Competition;
* The Financial Action Task Force Money Laundering Re-
port; and,
" The Bank Secrecy Report.
All of these efforts are OECD sponsored initiatives. But
they go beyond the OECD member countries and show the
more flexible ways to structure developing international insti-
tutional organizations. For example, the Financial Action Task
Force started out as an OECD body but then was "spun off' as
an independent group with non-OECD members. There are
other kinds of structures which could be considered to broaden
the participation in these types of cooperative exercises.
Now in urging these kinds of cooperative efforts which will
help preserve the income tax, I well may be siding with Ptole-
my and simply tossing another epicycle into a fatally flawed
system with the income tax at its center. Perhaps what we
need is a paradigm shift; in which case our consumption tax
Copernicuses may have it right. But in my view, the jury is
clearly still out on that issue. Much thought has to be given to
the steps which could be taken to preserve the income tax and
the institutional framework in which those steps could be tak-
en. I am not clear as to what the end of the process will be, but
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the results which we have been able to accomplish to date are
encouraging.

